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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Much has been written regarding the United States’ accession to the Madrid
Protocol. 1 Particularly relevant to this article are discussions that relate to the advantages
and disadvantages of such an implementation from the perspective of the United States. 2
Although most scholars agree on these points,3 no statistical analysis has yet been done to
verify or disprove these largely consistent views. The goal of this article is to provide a
statistical foundation that is beyond theory or speculation and instead goes to actual
implementation of international trademark filings.
This is not to suggest that previous commentators on this subject were inadequate
in their research efforts, for when their articles were written there was simply not enough
statistical data to report. 4 Now we are at a moment in time where we can capture an
accurate snapshot of trademark implementation via the Madrid Protocol. The statistics
gathered may simply lead to confirmation of the agreed upon advantages and
disadvantages of the Madrid Protocol implementation. However, it is also possible that
the statistics will disprove or weaken these arguments, not to mention raise some
interesting questions and ideas. It is important to emphasize that this article does not
intend to conclude what policies, laws, or circumstances are influencing United States
trademark behavior, but rather if United States trademark applicants are at all
disadvantaged as compared to other member countries with respect to the Protocol.
∗

Northwestern University School of Law, Candidate for J.D., 2008.
See, e.g., Thies Bosling, Securing Trademark Protection in a Global Economy — The United States’
Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 137 (2004); Baila H. Celedonia, Madrid
Protocol: Is it the Hoped for Panacea?, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 195-219 (Practising
Law Institute, 2001); Maria Guerra, The Rocky Road of the U.S. Accession to the Madrid Protocol: Could
This be the Year?, 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 525, 525 (2001) (specifying advantages
and disadvantages to the United States’ accession to the Madrid Protocol) [A.Q. Not sure this pincite says
what you think it does]; Linda M. Merritt, The Madrid Protocol: Special Issues for U.S. Practitioners, 12
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69 (2003); Charles Samuels, A Big Push Toward E-Government: The United
States Patent and Trademark Office and the Implementation of the Madrid Protocol, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 535 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels, A Big Push]; Jeffery M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels,
International Trademark Prosecution Streamlined: The Madrid Protocol Comes Into Force in the United
States, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 151 (2004) [hereinafter Samuels, International Trademark].
2
See, e.g., Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1; Guerra, supra note 1, at 525[A.Q.
See the query directed to this pincite above]; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96; Samuels, A Big Push, supra
note 1, at 548-57; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160.
3
See Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96;
Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1, at 548-57; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160.
4
Note that all the cited publications were published prior to 2005. See Bosling, supra note 1; Celedonia,
supra note 1; Guerra, supra note 1; Merritt, supra note 1; Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1; Samuels,
International Trademark, supra note 1.
1
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The focus of the research efforts will be on United States trademark applicants’
implementation of the Madrid Protocol and international filings, as compared to the top
four Madrid Protocol countries the United States exports goods and services to and
imports goods and services from. It just so happens that the top four Madrid Protocol
countries the United States exports goods and services to are the same top four Madrid
Protocol countries the United States imports goods and services from. 5 Therefore,
statistics were gathered in relation to the United States and the following four countries:
the United Kingdom, Germany, China, and Japan.
This article is divided into three separate parts: Background of United States
Involvement with International Trademark Treaties, Statistical Analysis, and
Conclusions. It is important to give a background of the United States’ involvement with
international trademark treaties to set the stage for the United States’ eventual accession
to the Madrid Protocol and to better understand the reasons for the United States’
accession. The Statistical Analysis section will compare United States trademark
applicants’ implementation of the Protocol with the implementation of the four
aforementioned countries. The Conclusion section will summarize the findings in the
Statistical Analysis section.
II. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK
TREATIES
A. Paris Convention

¶5

¶6

¶7

The United States’ involvement with international trademark treaties began in the
late 1800s. In 1883, the United States acceded to the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property. 6 This agreement was signed by nearly all industrialized nations at
the time. 7 Most importantly, however, it marked the first in a series of important steps
leading to the United States’ eventual accession to the Madrid Protocol.
Specifically, the importance of the Paris Convention is that it provided trademark
owners of member countries with equal access to trademark registration procedures in all
other member countries. 8 Furthermore, it established the concept of retroactive priority. 9
This means a trademark applicant has six months from the date of their first application
in their home member country to file a corresponding foreign application in order to
establish the priority date of their first trademark application. 10
Although the agreement provided a minimum standard of international trademark
protection in that it sets forth a common standard by which member countries should
5
See Madrid Protocol Member Countries,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Top U.S.
Trade Partners, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/ttp/toptradepartners.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2006).
6
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
7
World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Status, http://www.wipo.org/treaties/en/documents/pdf/d-paris.pdf.
8
Paris Convention, supra note 6, arts. 2-3.
9
Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
1, 10 (1998).
10
Id.
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review foreign filings, it is significant because it influenced future agreements by
providing standards to build from.
B. The TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA
¶8

¶9

Examples of future agreements which built upon the Paris Convention are the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS), 11 which came into
effect on January 1, 1995, 12 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
which came into effect on January 1, 1994. 13 The importance of these agreements is that
they established the existence of service marks, which were not recognized at the Paris
Convention. 14 Both agreements also established the definition of trademark as a sign
capable of distinguishing the goods and services of a person or business from those of
another person or business. 15 Furthermore, both of these agreements established the right
of a trademark owner to enjoin others from using identical or similar marks for identical
or similar goods or services, where such use would create a likelihood of confusion. 16
The importance of this provision is that countries must now not only consider a foreign
application, but enforce the rights of a foreign trademark owner.
Other important developments which result from these treaties are a higher level of
protection for famous marks and special provisions which protect geographic appellations
of origin. 17 For example, the United States has to protect the mark “Champagne” to
represent only goods derived from that particular region of France. This sort of
recognition and the recognition of other famous marks, like “Pepsi,” was very important
to the development of relations between foreign countries.18 Knowing that a popular
American mark would be protected in France will undoubtedly increase the confidence of
an American company to expand its business in that region. 19 Otherwise an American
company may be hesitant to establish a presence in a foreign country, knowing that it’s

11

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
12
Id.
13
Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Changing Landscape Of International Trademark Law,
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 433, 435 (arguing that NAFTA and TRIPS provisions closely resemble
one another and therefore can be discussed together) [hereinafter Samuels, Landscape].
14
Compare TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 15 (“Any sign, or any combination of
signs, capable of distinguishing the goods and services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings, shall be capable of constituting a trademark.”), with North American Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, pt. VI, ch. 17, art. 1708 (1993) (“For purposes of this
Agreement, a trademark consists of any sign, or any combination of signs, capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one person from those of another, including personal names, designs, letters, numerals,
colors, figurative elements, or the shape of goods or of their packaging.”) [hereinafter NAFTA].
15
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 15; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17,
art. 1708.
16
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 16; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17,
art. 1708.
17
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at pt. II, § 2, art. 22; NAFTA, supra note 14, at pt. VI, ch. 17, art.
1712. See also JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 1000 (3d ed. 2001)
(detailed description of how famous and well-known marks are protected under TRIPS and NAFTA).
18
See Bosling, supra note 1, at 137 (“Globalization demands effective tools that extend trademark
protection beyond national boundaries.”).
19
Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452 (“Adherence will facilitate U.S. business in its efforts to
sell registered products and services in overseas markets.”).
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famous American mark could be viably stolen and consequently degraded in that country.
Overall, this agreement strengthened international uniformity of trademark law.
C. The Trademark Law Treaty
¶10

Although established in 1994, the United States did not become a member of the
Trademark Law Treaty 20 until the year 2000. 21 Simply put, this treaty attempted to make
the process of filing a trademark in a foreign country less burdensome. To accomplish
this task the treaty attempted to harmonize differences in areas of substantive trademark
laws 22 that stood as barriers for applicants filing in foreign member countries. After
realizing the unrealistic nature of this goal, 23 the treaty set forth a list of maximum
requirements a member country can impose on foreign trademark applicants. 24 However,
it is important to note that this treaty did not provide the one-stop shop that the Madrid
Agreement and Protocol established.
D. The Madrid Agreement

¶11

The one-stop shop for international trademark registrations was finally established
by the Madrid Agreement (“Agreement”). 25 Although the United States never acceded to
the Agreement, 26 it established the basis for the important Madrid Protocol. The
Agreement established a method by which a trademark owner from a member country
could file a single application with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
in Geneva. 27 WIPO would then forward this application to all member countries
designated on the application. 28 At this time, each member country would independently
evaluate the application and either afford the trademark protection or deny it. 29 Although
the Agreement’s intentions were noble from the United States’ perspective, the
Agreement was negatively prejudicial for the reasons described below.
1. Requirement of Registration

¶12

The requirement of registration provided that a trademark must be registered in
order to file an application for international registration.30 Since registration procedures

20

Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 2004, http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo027en.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).
21
World Intellectual Property Organization, Trademark Law Treaty Status,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/tlt.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
22
Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 437.
23
Id. at 438.
24
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1005.
25
Id. at 1007.
26
See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 828
U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo015en.htm [hereinafter Madrid
Agreement].
27
Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 442. [A.Q. Again, no such page]
28
Id.
29
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1002.
30
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:31 (4th ed.
1996).
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vary widely from country to country, 31 those countries with stringent and thus potentially
protracted registration processes are at a disadvantage when compared with countries
whose registration processes are less stringent and thus shorter. Suppose Company A in
Country X wants to register Mark Z on an international scale via WIPO. Further suppose
Company B in Country Y also wants to register Mark Z on an international scale via
WIPO. Assume that Country X has a more complicated and stringent registration process
than Country Y, which ultimately results in a longer registration process. Even if
Company A files a trademark application in Country X well before Company B files a
trademark application in Country Y, it is possible that Company B could achieve
international registration in other countries (excluding Country X) via WIPO before
Company A.
¶13
This is because Company B will potentially achieve registration in Country Y
before Company A will achieve registration in Country X, even though Company A filed
for registration earlier than Company B. This will result in Company B being able to file
a trademark application via the Agreement at an earlier date than Company A, which
would give priority to Company B over Company A in those countries where both
Company A and Company B seek protection. To further illustrate this unfairness,
suppose that Company B thought of using Mark Z only after learning that Company A
created and used Mark Z. Company B could steal Company A’s idea, and obtain
international registration simply because Company B filed Mark Z in a country with less
stringent registration procedures. 32
¶14
Since the United States has a complex registration process, as compared to many
other countries, the time from application to registration is longer than that of other
countries. 33 Therefore, as illustrated by the example above, the requirement of
registration puts American companies at a disadvantage compared to companies from
other countries whose application to registration process is shorter than that of the United
States.
2. Central Attack
¶15

“The ‘rule of central attack’ 34 set forth in [A]rticle 6(3) of the Madrid Agreement
constituted another major cause of concern for the American trademark community.”35
31

Guerra, supra note 1, at 529 (“the U.S. registration process is lengthier than most other countries.”).
As one commentator put it:
An international registration must be based on a corresponding home registration. Therefore, the
American company will not be able to proceed with an international registration until the US registration
has been granted for a particular mark. American registrations may not usually be completed before ten to
twelve months even though there may be no serious objections to the mark or an opposition. The position
of an American trademark owner, therefore, is entirely different from a French or Belgium Trademark
owner who may proceed with an international registration practically the next day after his home
registration which is the same day as the date of filing. . . American trademark owners are anxious to go
ahead with foreign applications and not to wait for a year or more while their mark is going through the
registration procedure in the United States Patent Office.
Stephen P. Ladas, The Position Against Adherence: The Madrid Agreement for the International
Registration of Trademarks and the United States, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 346, 353-54 (1966).
33
Id.
34
Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 14.
35
Bosling, supra note 1, at 153 (citing McCarthy, supra note 30, § 29:31; Samuels, International
Trademark, supra note 1, at 443; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 14) (“Across the board authors argue that the
32
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This provision set forth that if a trademark owner’s base registration is cancelled within
five years of the international registration, then the international registration and all
national registrations based on it are also cancelled. 36
¶16
This provision’s unfairness is based upon similar reasoning set forth in the
Requirement of Registration section. A company is at a disadvantage if the company’s
home country has liberal trademark laws in regards to third-party attacks on trademarks. 37
This is because the country with these types of liberal trademark laws subjects its
companies to a higher risk of cancellation as compared to other companies seeking
registration in other countries, which do not have such liberal trademark laws in regards
to third-party attacks on trademarks.
This feature is especially troublesome to US firms because it makes the
continued lawful use of a mark abroad contingent on staving off any challenge to
domestic rights under the Lanham Act scheme. United States law permits any
party to petition for cancellation of a trademark within five years after
registration on any grounds that could have been asserted to bar registration
initially. Such post-registration cancellation is not uncommon. While such
challenges are frequently settled, the possibility that such a legal challenge could
also destroy the rights to the mark in a dozen or more foreign countries has
traditionally made US firms most unenthusiastic about the notion of adhering to
the Madrid Agreement. Obtaining separate national registrations, while a bit
more cumbersome, is frequently more prudent. 38

3. Time Frame for Rejection
¶17

A third requirement of the Madrid Agreement which drew criticism from United
States opponents to the Protocol is the one-year time requirement in which a WIPO
application had to be rejected by the country or countries claimed on the application. 39
The fact that the United States’ trademark registration processes is generally more
rigorous and time-consuming than other countries’ registration process puts United States
companies at a disadvantage. 40 Since the United States does not internally place a twelve
month requirement on domestic registration applications, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) would have to prioritize all WIPO applications over their
own domestic applications in order to meet the twelve month deadline, particularly when
the United States Patent and Trademark Office has a high volume of applications. 41 Not
central attack provision of article 6(3) is disproportionately disadvantageous for U.S. trademark owners.”).
36
MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:31.
37
Bosling, supra note 1, at 153 (“If the home registration is cancelled for reasons originating from the
domestic laws of the applicant’s home country, all of the international registrations based thereon become
invalid, even if they are in full accordance with the laws of any or all other member nations.”).
38
ANTHONY D’AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 307
(1997). See also Bosling, supra note 1, at 154 (“This perception was mainly based on the fact that in
comparison to the laws of most other nations, U.S. trademark law includes a far greater number of grounds
on which the validity of a trademark registration can be attacked.” (citing GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17,
at 1003; Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 443; Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer,
supra note 9, at 14)).
39
Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13.
40
Guerra, supra note 1, at 529; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 443.
41
Bosling, supra note 1, at 155 (“Consequently, the USPTO would likely encounter difficulties meeting
the one year deadline . . . . Eventually, the USPTO would have to grant preferential treatment to Madrid
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to mention this prioritization of WIPO applications would inevitably delay the
application process for United States trademark applicants solely seeking United States
registration. 42
4. Language
¶18

The Madrid Agreement also required the WIPO application to be written in
French. 43 Obviously translating a United States national application to French would
increase costs for United States trademark owners seeking international registration via
WIPO. 44 Furthermore, this requirement accentuated cultural differences, which may
have influenced the United States’ lack of cooperation in this Agreement. 45
E. Madrid Protocol

¶19

The United States acceded to the Madrid Protocol on November 2, 2003. 46 The
Madrid Protocol is essentially the same as the Madrid Agreement, but with a few
amendments designed to meet the objections of nations in opposition to the Madrid
Agreement. 47 Most importantly to the United States, the Madrid Protocol eliminates the
requirement of registration, alleviates concerns regarding central attack, extends the time
frame by which member nations must decide whether or not to register a mark, and
permits the application to be filed using the English language. 48
1. Elimination of Registration Requirement

¶20

All that is required of a WIPO applicant seeking registrations in foreign member
countries is a base application.49 This puts companies wishing to use the United States as
[Agreement] applications in order to meet the one-year deadline.” (citing Leaffer, supra note 9, at 13;
Guerra, supra note 1, at 529)); D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 308 (“Thus, if the United States joined
the Madrid Union, the USPTO might find it necessary to expedite consideration of international
registrations to ensure that final decisions on registrability were reached within the one-year time period.
That would necessarily result in an even more protracted decision-making process on domestic registration
applications.”).
42
D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 308 (“Thus, small and medium-sized US businesses, which are
unlikely to be interested in international registration, have traditionally viewed adherence to the Madrid
Protocol as a poor bargain – one with strictly hypothetical advantages, but with a realistic possibility of
delay and expense in the conduct of domestic business and affairs.”); Roger E. Schechter, Facilitating
Trademark Registration Abroad: The Implications of U.S. Ratification of the Madrid Protocol, 25 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 419, 421 (1991) (small and medium size businesses are unlikely interested in
international applications).
43
McCarthy, supra note 30, § 29:31; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 444; Schechter, supra note
42, at 429.
44
Schechter, supra note 42, at 430.
45
Bosling, supra note 1, at 156 (“[T]he language barrier issue became one of the most doggedly asserted
complaints brought forward by opponents to the Madrid System.”).
46
See List of Countries Belonging to Madrid Protocol, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
47
Bosling, supra note 1, at 159.
48
Steven Andreacola, Lanham Act Meets Madrid Protocol and Trademark Law Treaty: The Application
Process, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 489, 489-93 (2001).
49
Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, art.
2(1), June 28, 1989, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/madrid/en/legal_texts/pdf/madrid_protocol.pdf [hereinafter Madrid
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their base application for purposes of a WIPO application at no disadvantage when
compared to companies in other countries having less stringent registration
requirements. 50
2. Alleviates Central Attack Provision
¶21

Now a cancellation of a base registration does not automatically invalidate the
international registrations based on it. 51 A company whose base registration or
application is cancelled or refused has three months to file national registrations with
each of the international registrations sought on the corresponding WIPO application. 52
Each national application will retain the priority date of the original WIPO application. 53
3. Extends Time Frame for Trademark Offices

¶22

The time frame in which a national trademark office must reject an application is
extended from twelve to eighteen months. 54 This extended time frame gives countries
with stringent registration processes and a high volume of trademark filings, like the
United States, with sufficient time to process both national and WIPO applications
without having to unfairly prioritize the WIPO applications. 55
4. Language in English

¶23

Applications can now be filed via WIPO in the English language. 56 This of course
allows United States businesses to file applications without having to bother with
translating the application into French. Furthermore, it marks a significant step towards
alleviating cultural friction between the United States and some member countries of the
Madrid Agreement.
5. Advantages/Disadvantages to the Protocol

¶24

There are advantages to the United States acceding to the Madrid Protocol. 57 The
most obvious is convenience and cost efficiency of paying one fee and using one
trademark application as the basis for registration in many different countries. 58 Related
to this is that a company does not need to hire a special trademark agent in each country
Protocol] (last visited Feb. 12, 2008). Of course, a registration will suffice for purposes of filing a WIPO
application.
50
Guerra, supra note 1, at 531.
51
Id.
52
Madrid Protocol, supra note 49.
53
GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 17, at 1003; Guerra, supra note 1, at 531; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16.
54
Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 5(2)(b).
55
Bosling, supra note 1, at 161 (“This improvement is expected to align the processing time of
international applications in the United States with the normal time of examination in the USPTO instead
of requiring a preferred treatment of Madrid applications over domestic applications.” (citing MCCARTHY,
supra note 30, § 22:32)).
56
MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:31; Guerra, supra note 1, at 531; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16;
Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 447; Schechter, supra note 42, at 433.
57
Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452 (“Adherence will facilitate U.S. business in its efforts to
sell registered products and services in overseas markets.”).
58
Guerra, supra note 1, at 552; Leaffer, supra note 9, at 16; Samuels, Landscape, supra note 13, at 452.
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the company is seeking registration. 59 Before United States’ accession to the Protocol,
many countries required a national agent before a United States individual or company
could apply for registration. 60
¶25
Despite these advantages and changes made to the Madrid Agreement, there are
still critics of United States accession to the Protocol. 61 The disadvantages rest partly on
the differences between United States trademark registration processes and those of other
member countries. 62 The breadth of protection afforded a trademark by the USPTO is
generally narrower as compared to other member countries who do not employ such a
registration system. 63 In fact “[a] considerable amount of time is often spent during the
examination process in narrowing the original specification until the U.S. Trademark
Examining Attorney will accept it.” 64 It should also be noted that “U.S. trademark
practitioners are well aware, the USPTO will not allow registration of a mark for an
entire class heading as is allowed in some foreign jurisdictions.” 65
¶26
The repercussions of this, of course, are that a WIPO application, based on a United
States application or registration, will be disadvantaged as compared to companies basing
their WIPO application on a country which permits an applicant to file for a broad range
of goods and services. 66 An example of such a region is Benelux, which permits
registration of marks for class-wide headings and conducts no “substantive examination
analysis.” 67 The Protocol does not allow a WIPO application to expand the list of goods
and services protected beyond what was afforded in the base registration or application
when applying for registration in other member countries, 68 even if these other member
countries would have granted broader protection had the applicant bypassed the Madrid
Protocol and simply attempted national registration in these other countries. It has been
suggested that companies who wish to secure a broader class of goods or services should
either file independently in each foreign country in which the company wishes to secure

59

MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 29:32.
Id.
61
See, e.g., Bosling, supra note 1, at 162-70; Celedonia, supra note 1, at 201-19; Guerra, supra note 1,
at 525; Merritt, supra note 1, at 86-96; Samuels, A Big Push, supra note 1, at 548-57; Samuels,
International Trademark, supra note 1, at 160.
62
Schechter, supra note 42, at 433 (“[The Madrid Protocol] either fails to deal with other issues that
arise because of the details of U.S. law, or it creates certain new problems.”).
63
Id. (“Accordingly, the scope of protection of an international registration based on a U.S. application
or registration will necessarily be narrower in some jurisdictions than international registrations in the same
jurisdiction originating from an Office of Origin that permits a broader designation of goods and
services.”); D’AMATO & LONG, supra note 38, at 312 (“Under US practice, a fairly detailed specification is
required, and much of the application process is often devoted to narrowing the description of goods for
which protection is claimed until the PTO is satisfied.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 206 (“Consequently,
nationals of other countries will sometimes have the advantage of being able to file valid applications and
obtain registrations for the same mark in their home countries earlier than their U.S. counterparts who rely
on the Madrid Protocol.”); Leaffer, supra note 9, at 17.
64
Celedonia, supra note 1, at 203.
65
Merritt, supra note 1, at 86.
66
Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Ultimately, this means that U.S. applicants can obtain international
protection pursuant to the Madrid Protocol only within the narrow scope of their USPTO home
registration.” (citing Samuels, International Trademark, supra note 1, at 454)).
67
Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204.
68
Leaffer, supra note 9, at 17.
60
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rights, or file a WIPO application based on an application in a foreign country, which
allows for a broader classification of goods and services. 69
¶27
Another disadvantage is based upon the “[r]elative [d]ifficulty of [o]btaining a
[h]ome [r]egistration in the United States.”70 Because one’s WIPO trademark application
can be based upon a base application, if this base application is cancelled or refused, the
applicant will have three months to independently file national applications in each
foreign country in which he or she sought protection in. 71 Since it is more difficult to
obtain registration in the United States than in other countries, there is a relatively high
likelihood of having to file independently in each foreign country. 72 At this stage, the
convenience and cost-effectiveness of the Protocol is nullified and reversed. 73 One could
avoid this complication by filing national trademark applications in other countries.
¶28
The last disadvantage of filing a WIPO application in the United States is based on
the requirement to state either a use or a bona-fide intent to use. 74 National applications
in many other member countries do not impose this requirement, 75 therefore, trademark
applicants in those countries may have a significant advantage over their United States
counterparts, simply because they have fewer hurdles to jump before filing an application
or obtaining registration. Suppose Company A has obtained Mark Z in the United States
for a particular list of goods and services M. Further suppose that Company A has made a
decision not to expand Mark Z into other goods and services N for at least an
undetermined set of time, and, therefore, could not justify stating a bona-fide intent to use
on goods and services N. Unless Company A files national applications for Mark Z
protecting additional goods and services N in countries that do not impose the use or
intent to use requirement, then Company A may be prevented from obtaining this
registration via the Protocol at a later date, when use or a bona-fide intent to use exists.
This problem is typified when one considers piratical trademark applicants in those
countries who could file for Mark Z protecting goods and services N before Company A
begins to use or intends to use the Mark Z in connection with goods and services N.
69
Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Mark owners who put great weight on obtaining international
protection for broad categories of goods and services may still want to consider filing national applications
in the countries where they plan to use their marks.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204 (“[I]t may be better
to undertake direct national filing in order to obtain broader protection.”); Merritt, supra note 1, at 86
(“Accordingly, a U.S. trademark owner seeking protection of its mark in one of these jurisdictions could
obtain substantially broader protection for the mark by naming additional goods and services in a national
application . . . .”).
70
Celedonia, supra note 1, at 205.
71
Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 9(5).
72
Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“This [requirement] imposes a special challenge on U.S. mark owners,
since their applications are more likely to be denied or cancelled than applications filed by foreign mark
owners in their respective home countries.”).
73
Merritt, supra note 1, at 94 (“The cost savings and other advantages that may have resulted from
seeking protection initially though the Protocol will, of course, be lost.”).
74
Id. at 88 (“[I]n order to file an application for the mark in the United States, the applicant must have
used or have a bona fide intent-to-use the mark on all of the goods and services named in the application.”);
Celedonia, supra note 1, 206 (“In the United States, a valid trademark application must contain a statement
either that the applicant has used, or that it has a bona fide intent to use, the mark in commerce. In the
United States, an applicant cannot get a filing date until it has either used or alleged an intent to use the
mark in commerce.”).
75
Celedonia, supra note 1, at 206 (“By contrast, national applications in many other countries do not
require a statement of the applicant’s use or bona fide intent to use the mark, and many do not require proof
of use before the registration issues.”); Merritt, supra note 1, at 88.
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III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
¶29

Three years have passed since the United States acceded to the Madrid Protocol,
and there is now sufficient data to draw well-founded conclusions based on actual
trademark activity. The next section of this article will analyze United States
international trademark activity as compared with those from four other Madrid Protocol
member countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan. The reason for the
statistical comparison is to provide a basis to conclude whether or not United States
trademark applicants are actually advantaged or disadvantaged with respect to the Madrid
Protocol. 76 This is based on the logical assumption that if a particular member country is
actually disadvantaged in regards to the Protocol, then the country’s international
trademark filings, as compared to other member countries, will represent this
disadvantage. 77 Of course, comparing every member country’s trademark activity to that
of the United States would be unreasonable. 78 By choosing the top four member
countries the United States exports goods and services to and imports goods and services
from, the focus of this comparison is on those member countries which are most relevant
to United States trademark applicants. 79
¶30
If United States trademark applicants are advantaged or disadvantaged as compared
to the aforementioned member countries, then the data gathered in this section will
convey a disparity between these countries in international trademark activity. Of course,
the purpose of this article is not to make a determination of what policies, laws, or
circumstances are driving a specific disparity, but rather if there is in fact an actual
disparity from the United States’ perspective. 80
¶31
The first table shows how United States trademark applicants reacted when they
sought registration in one of the foreign member countries that the United States most
heavily exports to.

76

This article assumes that data stemming from actual implementation, as compared to conjecture based
on trademark law comparisons between member countries, provides a more accurate basis for concluding
the United States’ disposition in regards to the Protocol.
77
The basis for stating that one party is advantaged or disadvantaged is by means of comparison. One
party is simply not advantaged or disadvantaged; the party is advantaged or disadvantaged as compared to
other parties.
78
There are over sixty countries belonging to the Madrid Protocol. See List of Countries Belonging to
Madrid Protocol, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2006).
79
This assumes that United States trademark applicants are generally more concerned with how their
trademark activity compares with China, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan than, for example, Albania.
80
Although there may be other factors beyond those of differences in trademark laws amongst the
countries which may influence these statistics, this article is not specifically addressing what policies or
laws need to be changed, but if policies or laws need to be changed. Of course, this article assumes that if
United States trademark applicants are in fact disadvantaged in regards to the Protocol, then this fact will
be effectuated in the statistics by a disparity between United States trademark applicants’ activity and
trademark activity from the aforementioned foreign countries.
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TABLE 1.
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (from 2004–
Present) 85
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via National
Registration (from 2004–
Present)
Percentage of United
States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (from 2004–
Present)

Germany 81
1102

United Kingdom 82
1163

China 83
3347

Japan 84
3479

2125

4882

N/A

14737

34.2%

19.2%

N/A

19.1%

This table illustrates that foreign national applications in Germany, the United Kingdom,
and Japan appear to be more popular amongst United States foreign trademark applicants
than filing in these countries via WIPO. It appears that United States’ trademark
applicants would rather spend the extra money in application fees and hiring a foreign
agent to file national trademark applications in these foreign countries than to seek the
convenience and cost effectiveness of the Madrid Protocol. The disadvantages stated
above regarding the United States’ accession to the Madrid Protocol are most likely the
basis for this statistical finding.
¶32
The following two tables are an exact replica of the previous table, except they
restrict activity to a single year. The first table describes 2004 activity, while the next
table describes 2005 activity.

81

TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using
database identifier “ger-tm”).
82
TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “uk-tm”).
83
No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English.
84
TRADEMARKSCAN – Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database
identifier “ip-japan”).
85
TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”).
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TABLE 2.
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (2004) 90
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via National
Registration (2004)
Percentage of United
States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (2004)

Germany 86
448

United Kingdom 87
430

China 88
1048

Japan 89
976

910

1639

N/A

5664

33.0%

20.8%

N/A

14.7%

TABLE 3.
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (2005) 95
United States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via National
Registration (2005)
Percentage of United
States Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection via Madrid
Protocol (2005)

Germany 91
432

United Kingdom 92
446

China 93
1420

Japan 94
1524

830

1730

N/A

5921

34.2%

20.5%

N/A

20.5%

86

TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using
database identifier “ger-tm”).
87
TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “uk-tm”).
88
No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English.
89
TRADEMARKSCAN - Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database
identifier “ip-japan”).
90
TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”).
91
TRADEMARKSCAN - Germany, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using
database identifier “ger-tm”).
92
TRADEMARKSCAN - United Kingdom, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “uk-tm”).
93
No online Chinese Trademark Database available in English.
94
TRADEMARKSCAN - Japan, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using database
identifier “ip-japan”).
95
TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”).
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It appears from these tables that many United States foreign trademark applicants are
fairly consistent in their trademark activity from year to year, particularly with regard to
the United Kingdom and Germany. The two tables simply reaffirm the fact that when
United States foreign trademark applicants seek registration in the top countries to which
the United States exports goods and services to, they will take extra precautions to ensure
that their trademark receives the full breadth of protection in those countries. Generally,
this full breadth of protection is granted by filing national trademark applications in those
respective countries, rather than filing a WIPO application for protection in that
country. 96
¶33
However, this data is incomplete without a comparison to the other member
countries mentioned in this article. If trademark applicants in each of these countries
react in a similar fashion to United States trademark applicants, then at the very least we
can find that United States trademark applicants are not disadvantaged in the Madrid
Protocol compared to these other member countries. The next table presents findings in
this area.
TABLE 4.
Foreign Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection in United
States via Madrid
Protocol 97
Foreign Trademark
Applicants Seeking
Protection in United
States via National
Registration 98
Percentage of Foreign
Trademark Applicants
Seeking Protection in the
United States via Madrid
Protocol

Germany
4467

United Kingdom
1259

China
1539

Japan
1204

15317

10592

7921

12485

22.6

10.6

16.3

8.8

These foreign countries clearly use the Madrid Protocol far less than their United States
counterparts. This implies that, as compared to these foreign countries, the United States
is not as strongly disadvantaged in regards to the Madrid Protocol as one may be led to
believe. In fact, because United States trademark applicants are using the Madrid
96

Bosling, supra note 1, at 168 (“Mark owners who put great weight on obtaining international
protection for broad categories of goods and services may still want to consider filing national applications
in the countries where they plan to use their marks.”); Celedonia, supra note 1, at 204 (“[I]t may be better
to undertake direct national filing in order to obtain broader protection.”); see also Merritt, supra note 1, at
86 (“Accordingly, a U.S. trademark owner seeking protection of its mark in one of these jurisdictions could
obtain substantially broader protection for the mark by naming additional goods and services in a national
application . . . .”).
97
TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”).
98
TRADEMARKSCAN - U.S. Federal, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006) (using
database identifier “fed-tm”).
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Protocol at a higher rate than these foreign counterparts, it would appear that the Madrid
Protocol provides more of an advantage to United States trademark applicants than
trademark applicants in the aforementioned countries.
¶34
However, filing national applications is not the only method by which a trademark
applicant can bypass the laws of its home nation. The next set of tables will compare
WIPO applications submitted by each country. The focus of this comparison is on the
percentage of a particular country’s trademark applicants who file WIPO applications
with a base registration in a foreign country, rather than in one’s home country, before
filing an international application via WIPO.
TABLE 5. 99

United States Trademark
Applicants (2004 to
Present)
English (UK) Trademark
Applicants (2004 to
Present)
German Trademark
Applicants (2004 to
Present)
Japanese Trademark
Applicants (2004 to
Present)
Chinese Trademark
Applicants (2004 to
Present)

# Of Marks filed using
Protocol and Base
Registration in Home
Country
5809

# Of Marks filed
using Protocol but
Base Registration in
Foreign Country
414

% Of Marks filed
using Protocol but
Base Registration in
Foreign Country
6.7%

2136

857

28.6%

19003

1666

8.1%

1928

133

6.5%

3104

70

2.2%

It is evident from this data that United States trademark applicants do not upwardly
deviate considerably from the practices of the other foreign countries mentioned,
regarding filing a base application in a foreign country prior to filing a WIPO application.
This data does not support the assertion that United States trademark applicants believe
they are disadvantaged with regard to the Protocol to an extent significantly greater than
that of the other countries analyzed. Had United States trademark applicants believed
they were more disadvantaged than trademark applicants of the other member countries
mentioned, this belief would have manifested itself in either a relatively high percentage
of foreign filings abroad prior to filing a WIPO application. 100 If that option was not
available or viable to the applicants, 101 they would not have used the Madrid Protocol at
99

TRADEMARKSCAN - International Register, http://www.westlaw.com (last accessed Nov. 7, 2006)
(using database identifier “wipo-tm”).
100
According to the data presented, the United Kingdom has a much higher rate than the other countries
listed of using a base registration for WIPO in a foreign country. The other member countries compared in
this table are relatively similar.
101
Madrid Protocol, supra note 49, art. 2, sec. 1(1) (the basic application or registration can only be in
the country (a) of which the applicant is a national, or (b) of which the applicant is domiciled, or (c) where
the applicant has a “real and effective industrial or commercial establishment").
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all, 102 resulting in a relatively high percentage of national applications in foreign
countries, as discussed in the first table of this Section. Both of these comparisons
weaken the assertion that United States trademark applicants are disadvantaged by the
Madrid Protocol.
¶35
Of course it is possible that the trend of United States trademark applicants is more
indicative of what is actually occurring or will actually occur in the future. The next
table describes how United States trademark applicants behaved on a year-by-year basis
from 2004. The theory is that, if the disadvantages in dealing with the Madrid Protocol
are in fact present, then these applicants, as their familiarity with the Madrid Protocol
increases, these applicants would either decrease their use of the Protocol or increase the
use of a foreign filing prior to filing a WIPO application. In fact, the opposite has
occurred.
TABLE 6. 103

United States activity in 2004
United States activity in 2005
United States activity in 2006

Number Of Marks filed using
Protocol and Base Registration
in Home Country
1576
2543
2253 (prorated)

Number Of Marks filed using
Protocol but Base Registration
in Foreign Country
172
153
129 (prorated)

The data mentioned so far supports the implementation of the Madrid Protocol as an
effective tool for United States practitioners. As familiarity with the Madrid Protocol
increases, it appears United States trademark applicants are relying more heavily on base
registrations in the United States as opposed to a foreign country. Furthermore, it appears
the sheer number of trademark applicants using the Madrid Protocol is increasing. 104 A
peripheral cause for concern is the predicted slight drop off in total WIPO applications in
2006 from United States trademark applicants. However, data for 2006 is only prorated
and is therefore too speculative to bring the issue to surface. Not to mention the drop-off
is not significant enough to draw any conclusions.
IV. CONCLUSION
¶36

Based on actual data, an argument cannot be made that United States trademark
applicants are at a severe disadvantage with regard to the Madrid Protocol when
compared to a select group of nations. The aforementioned analysis shows two methods
by which a country could bypass their own trademark laws and file in a foreign country:
(1) filing a national application in a foreign country; and (2) filing a national application
in a foreign country and using that application as the base application for a WIPO
102

Among the countries analyzed in this article, the United States is second only to Germany for WIPO
trademark filings from 2004 to present. With regard to all member countries, the United States filed the
third most trademark applications in 2005, jumping from sixth place in 2004. See Press Release 437,
WIPO, Record Number Of International Trademark Applications In 2005 With Germany Leading For 13th
Consecutive Year (Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/en/2006/wipo_pr_2006_437.html) (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
103
Id.
104
In particular, there was a significant rise in filings between 2004 and 2005.
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application. After comparing this activity between the United States and a select group
of member countries, there is no statistical deviation that suggests that the United States
is at a disadvantage with regard to the Madrid Protocol. Of course, as compared to every
member country of the Madrid Protocol, United States trademark applicants may not be
the ones who benefit the most from implementation of the Madrid Protocol, but this data
shows that they are not benefiting the least.
¶37
However, a deeper concern may be that all nations mentioned in this article do not
find the Madrid Protocol to be sufficiently advantageous as compared to filing nationally
in a foreign country. This larger concern, however, may only be fully addressed if
complete harmonization of substantive trademark law is achieved. As long as there is an
advantage to filing nationally within a foreign country, one can continue to expect
national applications to be the predominant method by which applicants seek protection
in a foreign country.
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